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INTRODUCTION
In order to create attractive residential subdivisions, developers often
impose restrictions, enforceable as covenants running with the land, to
control the nature of the improvements and the uses of the lots.' One
commonly employed provision limits the occupants of the property to a
single family by barring use of the property for other than a "single
family dwelling"2 or through other similar language.3
Such clauses present difficult doctrinal and policy issues for the
courts. To decide these cases, courts must understand and define "fam-
ily." This has traditionally been a difficult task for family professionals
and scholars.4 The undertaking is made harder in light of current ma-
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. B.A. 1974,
J.D. 1977, University of Pennsylvania.
This Article uses real covenant, covenant running with the land, covenant, and
servitude synonymously. For a discussion of the proposed unification of servitudes law,
see infra note 34 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Sys., Co., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269
N.W.2d 673 (1978); London v. Handicapped Facilities Bd., 637 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982); Knudtson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 345 N.W.2d 4 (1984); Crane Neck
Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460
N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 804 (1984); Jackson v.
Williams, 714 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1985); Omega Corp. v. Malloy, 288 Va. 12, 319
S.E.2d 728 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985).
3 Some of these provisions are very clear. See, e.g., London, 637 S.W.2d at 214 n.1
("no more than one family shall live in any residence"); Feely v. Birenbaum, 554
S.W.2d 432, 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (not to be used "by more than one family");
Kiernan v. Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ("one family only"). See
generally Annotation, What Constitutes a "Family" Within Meaning of Zoning Regu-
lation or Restrictive Covenant, 71 A.L.R.3d 693 (1976).
4 See, e.g., E. DYER, THE AMERICAN FAMILY: VARIETY AND CHANGE 16 (1979)
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jor changes in American family life. These developments include signif-
icant rises in the number of divorces,5 single parent families,6 and
working women;7 developing equality between husbands and wives;8
and decreases in birth rates9 and family size.' 0 Currently, the living
arrangements of over seventy-five percent of the population differs from
the earlier model of a working husband, nonworking wife, and two or
more children." Moreover, courts must confront single family use cove-
nants in the context of recently developing living and support relation-
ships that are alternatives to the traditional family. These developments
include increases in heterosexual couples living together; expansion of
the traditional family to include other intimate people who share re-
sponsibilities and provide mutual emotional support; 3 growing num-
(requiring relationship by blood, marriage or adoption); M. GORDON, THE AMERICAN
FAMILY: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 25-28 (1978) (discussing functional vs. kinship
tests, with former not requiring relationship of blood, marriage, or adoption but focus-
ing on shared activities and goals); S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, WHAT'S HAPPENING
TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY? 11 (1981) (excluding unmarried couples).
- See M. GORDON, supra note 4, at 293-96; POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU,
INC., THE AMERICAN FAMILY: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES 2 (1984) [hereafter Pop-
ULATION REFERENCE] (a record of 1.21 million divorces in 1981); WHITE HOUSE
CONFERENCE ON FAMILIES, A SUMMARY: LISTENING TO AMERICA'S FAMILIES 79
chart 3 (1980) [hereafter WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE].
6 See E. DYER, supra note 4, at 411 (stating increase due to increased divorce,
unwed mothers, and single parent adopting); S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, supra note 4,
at 13 (estimating that approximately 45% of children born in the mid-1970s will live in
a one parent family at least some time prior to eighteenth birthday); WHITE HousE
CONFERENCE, supra note 5, at 78 chart 2 (finding percentage of single parent families
increased from 11 to 19 between 1970 and 1978).
7 M. GORDON, supra note 4, at 71 (stating women were 3% of labor force in
1890); cf. Mintz & Kellogg, Recent Trends in American Family History: A Commen-
tary Describing Dimensions of Demographic and Cultural Change, 21 Hous. L. REV.
789, 790 (1984) (finding that by 1980 over 50% of white married women were in the
work force).
I See Mintz & Kellogg, supra note 7, at 792.
9 See M. GORDON, supra note 4, at 115 (stating fertility rate has fallen below
replacement level over recent years); POPULATION REFERENCE, supra note 5, at 4
(stating 1975 birth rate was 1.7 children per woman versus 1957 rate of 3.6 for white
women and 4.8 for black women).
1o See M. GORDON, supra note 4, at 63-64 (finding decrease in extended families);
POPULATION REFERENCE, supra note 5, at 7 (noting smaller size of households).
1t See S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, supra note 4, at 8.
12 See E. DYER, supra note 4, at 399-400; S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, supra note
4, at 11; POPULATION REFERENCE, supra note 5, at 7; see also M. GORDON, supra
note 4, at 187 (stating that from 1970 to 1976 government figures show increase from
654,000 to 1.32 million people; figures viewed to be low).
13 See E. DYER, supra note 4, at 401; M. GORDON, supra note 4, at 353.
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bers of foster parents; 14 group homes for the emotionally or develop-
mentally handicapped; 5 and increased acceptance of homosexual "life
partners. 16 Finally, in determining these cases, courts must recognize
and address the rapid increase in demand for housing units, caused at
least in part by these changes in families and living arrangements.' 7
Courts have already decided whether occupancy of a property by an
extended family, 8 a foster home for disabled children, 9 a group of el-
derly citizens,20 two single men jointly owning a home, 21 group homes
for the mentally and developmentally disabled,22 a number of college
students, 23 boarders and tenants,24 and religious groups, 2 violates a sin-
gle family use covenant. One can imagine, as well, attempts to enforce
such clauses against occupancy by other current alternatives to tradi-
tional family life, such as an unmarried heterosexual couple, 26 foster
14 See Eastman, Foster Parenthood: A Nonnormative Parenting Arrangement, in
ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL FAMILY LIVING 96-97 (H. Gross & M. Sussman
eds. 1982).
15 See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
16 Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 143 A.D.2d 44, 45, 531 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (1988)
("gay life partner").
17 See POPULATION REFERENCE, supra note 5, at 7 (increase in number of house-
holds causing rapid increase in demand for housing units).
Is See, e.g., Kiernan v. Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Tucker v.
Soliz, 483 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
19 See, e.g., Evergreen Meadow's Homeowners' Ass'n v. Double D Manor, Inc.,
743 P.2d 39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Sys. Co., 84
Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978); London v. Handicapped Facilities Bd., 637
S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
20 See, e.g., Jayno Heights Landowners Ass'n v. Preston, 85 Mich. App. 443, 271
N.W.2d 268 (1978).
21 See, e.g., Feely v. Birenbaum, 554 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
22 See, e.g., Craig v. Bossenbery, 134 Mich. App. 543, 351 N.W.2d 596 (1984);
Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 407 (Mo.
1986); Knudtson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 345 N.W.2d 4 (1984); Jackson v.
Williams, 714 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1985); Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1981).
23 See, e.g., Seely v. Phi Sigma Delta House Corp., 245 Mich. 252, 222 N.W. 180
(1928); McCord v. Pichel, 35 A.D.2d 879, 315 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1970).
24 See, e.g., Hooker v. Alexander, 129 Conn. 433, 29 A.2d 308 (1942); Kiernan v.
Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Southampton Civic Club v. Couch, 159
Tex. 464, 322 S.W.2d 516 (1958).
25 See, e.g., Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v. Paulist Fathers, Inc., 306 Mich. 253,
10 N.W.2d 847 (1943); Cash v. Catholic Diocese, 414 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. Ct. App.
1967).
26 See generally Zavala v. City of Denver, 759' P.2d 664 (Colo. 1988) (construing
zoning ordinance); City of Takoma Park v. County Bd. of Appeals, 259 Md. 619, 270
A.2d 772 (1970) (same); City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
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parents with nondisabled children,27 "three unrelated schoolteachers," 28
a homosexual couple,29 and two unmarried women (each with children)
living together.3 0
There are different perspectives on how recent changes in American
family life and the growth of alternatives should affect the courts' en-
forcement of single family use restrictions. Two questions emerge. In
light of a growing spirit of personal autonomy and the development of
new lifestyles, should individuals be restrained from choosing noncon-
forming family, living and personal relationships within their own
homes? In a time when there are many pressures on the traditional
family, can and should people's agreements to insulate traditional fam-
ily arrangements in a neighborhood be respected? The issues are inex-
tricably linked while in fundamental conflict, since it is the same tradi-
tional family mold from which the nonconformist seeks to escape that
the majority wants to protect. These are difficult and provocative social
questions that require careful resolution in the context of disputes over
single family use clauses.
These issues are also important since the courts' decisions in single
family use covenant cases will likely have an effect on family choices in
the late twentieth century. To the extent that courts are not receptive to
new types of alternate family arrangements, they may create disincen-
tives to such structures and shape future family choices.3 The courts'
decisions will also directly affect the variety of shelter arrangements
available to families and other groups of people that live together, a
(same); Marino v. Mayor of Norwood, 77 N.J. Super. 587, 187 A.2d 217 (Ct. App.
Div. 1963) (same).
27 See generally City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756,
357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974) (applying "single family unit" within zoning ordinance);
Saunders v. Clark County Zoning Dep't, 66 Ohio St. 2d 259, 421 N.E.2d 152 (1981)
(same).
21 Omega Corp. v. Malloy, 288 Va. 12, 319 S.E.2d 728 (1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1192 (1985).
2 See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 143 A.D.2d 44, 45, 531 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563
(1988) (stating "gay life partner" not a member of family of deceased tenant entitled to
continue the lease). Contra Jane St. Co. v. Yalis, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 13, 1988, at 13, col. 3
(Civ. Ct.) (finding no rational basis to exclude "gay life partners" from class of family
members entitled to continue the lease).
10 See, e.g., People v. Skidmore, 69 Misc. 2d 320, 329 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct.
1971) (construing a zoning ordinance).
31 While we are told by the economists that people will react as rational economic
actors to incentives and disincentives and make their choices on that level, they may not
act so rationally when it comes to family choices and matters of the heart. Thus, when
a court imposes disincentives to certain family arrangements through occupancy restric-
tions, the degree of effect on people's plans remains to be seen.
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very important issue during a time of tight housing.
This Article maintains that single family use covenants should not be
applied to limit personal choices taking place within the home. Rather,
they should be enforced only to the extent that they limit fallout pro-
jected from a household on the rest of the neighborhood. "Family"
would thus have a flexible meaning in the context of single family use
restrictions. This proposal is necessary not only in light of general pol-
icy considerations but also because it strikes a proper balance between
freedom of contract values and the policy against restrictions on land
which are inherent in real covenants law. The approach will protect
traditional family life to a great, albeit not the fullest, extent while re-
specting individual autonomy. Moreover, the proposed rule also seems
appropriate when contrasted with other devices limiting family housing
choices, such as single family use restrictions created by zoning and
private covenants restricting the age of occupants.
Part I reviews the conflict essential to all real covenants, including
single family use restrictions, between freedom of contract and the pol-
icy against ties on land. It offers a policy basis for the rule suggested in
this Article. Part II shows how courts have failed to reach the proper
result in light of these policies when deciding single family use covenant
cases. Part III suggests a doctrinal basis to effectuate the suggested re-
sult both under current law and a modernized law of servitudes. Part
IV examines zoning for single family use and private age restrictions
since they serve as valuable contrasts to single family use covenants and
also tell much about how the law of property is currently defining the
family.
I. SINGLE FAMILY USE RESTRICTIONS AND REAL COVENANTS
A. The Relevance of Real Covenants
The debate over whether private land use restrictions can be used to
limit the types of people occupying property takes place in the context
of the doctrine of covenants running with the land and its competing
policy considerations.32 This makes analysis of the issues more compli-
cated, but reference to the policy framework of covenants ultimately can
yield a more effective resolution of the issues.
People enter into private land use agreements to allocate rights and
responsibilities in realty. The agreements allow the acquisition of non-
possessory rights in the land of another. They might confirm on the
32 For an overview of the doctrinal requirements of real covenants, see Stoebuck,
Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. REV. 861 (1977).
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holder an affirmative right, such as a right of way. They might create a
negative restriction that gives its holder the right to prevent activities of
the burdened property, such as a prohibition of nonresidential uses.
Traditionally, affirmative rights have been governed by easements law
and restrictions by real covenants law,33 although recent scholarship
suggests a merger of the two doctrines into a unified law of servitudes. 4
Under classic rules, a single family use restriction is categorized as a
real covenant.
Consider the situation where a landowner makes an agreement with
her neighbor to restrict the neighbor's land to single family use. The
original promisee should be able to enforce against the original prom-
isor as a straightforward matter of contract law. However, when a sub-
sequent owner of the original promisee's lot seeks enforcement against
33 There are, of course, traditional exceptions. Affirmative obligations binding the
owner of the burdened land, such as a requirement to pay maintenance costs for com-
mon areas, are evaluated as covenants running with the land, see generally Neponsit
Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793
(1938), while certain negative restrictions are treated as easements. See R. CUNNING-
HAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 8.1 (1984)
(light, air, view); 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1 405
(1987) (lateral support, stream flow); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 452
comments a, b (1944).
34 E.g., Berger, Some Reflections on a Unified Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1323 (1982); Berger, Integration of the Law of Easements, Real Covenants and
Equitable Servitudes, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337 (1986); Browder, Running Cove-
nants and Public Policy, 77 MICH. L. REV. 12 (1978); Epstein, Notice and Freedom
of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982); French, To-
ward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1261 (1982) [hereafter French, Modern Law of Servitudes]; French, Design Pro-
posal for the New Restatement of the Law of Property - Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1213 (1988) [hereafter French, Design Proposal]; Korngold, Privately Held
Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants
and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984) [hereafter Korngold, Conservation Servi-
tudes]; McDougal, Land-Use Planning by Private Volition: A Framework for Policy-
Oriented Inquiry, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1974); Newman & Losey, Covenants Running
with the Land, and Equitable Servitudes: Two Concepts, or One?, 21 HASTINGS L.J.
1319 (1970); Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1177 (1982); Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments on Professors
French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403 (1982); Sterk, Freedom from Free-
dom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV.
615 (1985); Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Opti-
mizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L.
REV. 1. I have suggested an additional merger of servitudes and defeasible fees. See
Korngold, For Unifying Servitudes and Defeasible Fees: Property Law's Functional
Equivalents, 66 TEX. L. REV. 533 (1988) [hereafter Korngold, Unifying Servitudes].
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a subsequent owner of the original promisor's lot, classical contract law
does not provide an easy solution. Rather, the defendant may offer a
two-prong argument against liability by stating that she never promised
anything and that no promise was ever made to plaintiff but only to
the original promisee. The law of covenants running with the land de-
veloped to meet this problem of second generation enforcement and to
provide a doctrinal basis to move the benefits and the burdens of the
promise to future owners.35
Therefore, one would expect that courts deciding about the enforce-
ment of single family use agreements would operate in the universe of
real covenants. Oddly enough, none of the cases cited in this Article
states that real covenants are relevant. Neither do the cases apply the
usual tests to determine whether the covenant should run, even though
the stated facts show that second generation enforcement is sought.3 6
Moreover, the courts rarely indicate whether the plaintiff and defend-
ant are the original promisor and promisee or second generation own-
ers, the key facts necessary to determine whether contract or real cove-
nant analysis is appropriate. 37 Rather, the cases approach the issue as a
straightforward contract interpretation issue.38 Additionally, not one of
31 See Newman & Losey, supra note 34, at 1323 (suggesting that the privity re-
quirement was a meaningless attempt to justify the running of burdens); RESTATE-
MENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 537 comment h (1944) (explaining touch and concern
as a means to limit the covenants which can run). Unfortunately, much of this doctrinal
framework merely creates hoops for an enforcing party to jump through and has little
to do with addressing the difficult problem of binding someone who has not expressly
consented to be bound. Contract presupposes consent before one can be obligated. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 328 (1981); E. FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS § 11.10 (1982).
36 See, e.g., Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987) (finding defendant was successor to original purchaser); Feely v. Birenbaum, 554
S.W.2d 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that since restriction created in 1914 and
defendants purchased in 1971, it is unlikely they are original owners); Crane Neck
Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460
N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 804 (1984) (holding defendant
is lessee from original covenantor).
37 See, e.g., London v. Handicapped Facilities Bd., 637 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Knudtson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 345 N.W.2d 4 (1984); McCord v. Pichel,
35 A.D.2d 879, 315 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1970); Kiernan v. Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895
(Sup. Ct. 1953); Gregory v. State, 495 A.2d 997 (R.I. 1985); Southampton Civic Club
v. Couch, 159 Tex. 464, 322 S.W.2d 516 (1958); Omega Corp. v. Malloy, 288 Va. 12,
319 S.E.2d 728 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985).
38 Even when the facts indicate that the action is between the original covenanting
parties, there is no mention of why contract, as opposed to real covenant, analysis is
appropriate. See, e.g., J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc.,
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the decisions asks whether a single family use covenant "touches and
concerns" the benefitted and burdened parcels, a prerequisite for a cov-
enant to run. Finally, while there is vague reference in a few of the
cases to some of the policy themes of real covenants, few, if any, courts
make the clear and articulated analysis of the policy conflict of real
covenants that is necessary to achieve better decision making in single
family use restriction cases.
B. The Policy Conflict
Some courts dealing with single family use restrictions engage in a
battle of maxims. One set states that the "clear intent and plain and
unambiguous purposes expressed" in a covenant should be enforced, in
the manner of other contracts.39 Another group, however, notes that
"restrictive covenants are not favorites of the law .. .[and should] be
read narrowly in favor of the free use of property." 4 This linguistic
duel reflects the conflict between values of freedom of contract and a
policy disfavoring restrictions on land (the "antirestrictions policy"). As
with other real covenants, courts dealing with single family use restric-
tions do not examine and articulate this conflict beyond the occasional
reference to a maxim.
1. Contract Values
There are compelling reasons why real covenants should be enforced
like other contracts.4 ' Indeed, scholars have recently argued for such a
result. 42 Single family use covenants should be evaluated in light of this.
302 N.C. 64, 274 S.E.2d 174 (1981).
39 Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981); accord Imler, 505
N.E.2d at 464; Craig v. Bossenbery, 134 Mich. App. 543, 351 N.W.2d 596, 599
(1984); Feely, 554 S.W.2d at 436.
40 Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d
407, 408 (Mo. 1986); accord Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, 358 So. 2d 1084,
1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Knudtson, 216 Neb. at 655, 345 N.W.2d at 6;J.T.
Hobby & Son, 302 N.C. at 70-71, 274 S.E.2d at 179; Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d
1017, 1021 (Okla. 1985); Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 434, 288 N.W.2d 815,
822 (1980).
41 In order to be bound, the successor to the covenantor's parcel must have notice of
the covenant. See, e.g., Meierhenry v. Smith, 208 Neb. 88, 302 N.W.2d 365, 366
(1981); Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, 778, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144 (1848); see also
Imler, 505 N.E.2d at 464; Feely, 554 S.W.2d at 437.
42 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 34, at 1329 (arguing that the law should accord the
intent of the parties a dominant position); French, Modern Law of Servitudes, supra
note 34, at 1305 (arguing that agreements creating servitudes should be treated like
[Vol. 22:951
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a. Efficiency
Real covenants assist in the efficient allocation of land resources by
allowing parties to transfer less than fee rights. Thus, one seeking to
limit the use of her neighbor's land to single family purposes can ac-
quire a servitude. She need not waste resources buying a fee, and the
neighbor can retain productive use of the land subject to the servitude.
In order to encourage parties to enter into such efficiency-maximizing
arrangements, the law must enforce them.
When real covenants are employed in a subdivision to grant recipro-
cal burdens and benefits among the parcels, there may be additional
efficiency gains. Although an individual parcel theoretically loses value
when it is restricted to single family use, the loss may be offset if the
restriction similarly binds surrounding lots and creates a valuable
"family environment."
Parties and courts relying on single family use covenants to bar non-
traditional living arrangements allude to efficiency. They indicate that
these covenants enhance the value of the benefitted land,43 and that fail-
ure to enforce them would depress property values.44 Courts recognize
that such covenants create property rights,45 and those who rely on re-
strictions in contracting should be protected. 46 One judge declared that
"[t]hose individuals who have invested their life savings in a home,
'The American Dream' are entitled to protection under the law, inclid-
ing enforcement of the covenant, which they relied on when investing in
the area .... -47
However, the strength of the efficiency argument is weakened since,
in at least some cases, little or no loss in the benefitted land's value
results from the nontraditional family use in question. 48 Such stable
values might occur if the nontraditional family use is neither wide-
spread nor highly nonconformist. On the other hand, stability also
might occur if purchasers in the marketplace do not really care what
goes on inside their neighbor's home as long as there are no spillovers
(such as noise) outside of the home that exceed those of a typical fain-
other agreements).
43 See, e.g., Imler, 505 N.E.2d at 464.
See, e.g., Kiernan v. Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (Sup. Ct. 1953);Jackson,
714 P.2d at 1019 n.4; Gregory v. State, 495 A.2d 997, 999 (R.I. 1985).
45 See, e.g., Imler, 505 N.E.2d at 464.
46 See, e.g., Kiernan, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
47 Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 448, 288 N.W.2d 815, 828 (1980) (Coffey,
J., dissenting).
48 See, e.g., Kiernan, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 901; Gregory, 495 A.2d at 1009.
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ily. If this is the case, the efficiency gains of a covenant controlling the
type of occupants (as opposed to their spillover effects) may be limited,
and may be outweighed by other policy considerations. 49
b. Moral Obligation
Some courts indicate that single family use restrictions should, like
other real covenants, be enforced for moral reasons. When a person has
actual or record notice of the servitude before buying, she can offer a
lower price to reflect the restriction and protect herself.50 If she does
not, she cannot subsequently evade the agreement and destroy the ex-
pectations of the covenantee about the nature of the community."' One
judge observed in a related case dealing with a covenant barring chil-
dren under twelve years of age:
All young couples buying living units can foresee the possibility of chil-
dren and this restriction has not 'snuck' up on them, for they well knew of
it prior to purchase or conception. The choice was theirs.5 2
Other real covenant cases state that it is also improper to allow the
covenantor to pay a reduced price for the land with the covenant and
then attempt to sell it at a higher price free of the burden.53
49 To some courts the lack of value loss is relevant. See, e.g., Gregory, 495 A.2d at
1002 (stating that character of neighborhood and quality of life not threatened by home
for mentally retarded). However, to other courts it is not. See, e.g., Kiernan, 123
N.Y.S.2d at 901 ("The fact that money damage to plaintiffs is unsubstantial is
immaterial.")
Covenants based on "irrational prejudice," see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (addressing zoning restricting group homes for the
mentally retarded), will also be valued by the hypothetical "rational economic person,"
and, if not, should they be protected for efficiency concerns?
50 See, e.g., Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 464 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987) (recorded covenants gave "notice to the world of their contents"); Kiernan,
123 N.Y.S.2d at 900 ("The defendants purchased their respective properties with ex-
press or implied knowledge of the restrictions and it is not contrary to equity that they
be compelled to respect them and the rights of others who, in reliance upon the protec-
tion of the covenants, established their residences in the locality.").
S1 See, e.g., Gregory, 495 A.2d at 999 (covenantee claiming that a group home for
the mentally retarded would depress property values and "'destroy the integrity . . .
and the tranquility of the neighborhood that we enjoy and paid for.' "); Crowley, 94
Wis. 2d at 448, 288 N.W.2d at 828 ("Those individuals who have invested their life
savings in land and a home ... are entitled to protection . . . including enforcement of
the covenant, which they relied on when investing in the area.").
12 Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, 358 So. 2d 1084, 1092-93 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977).
53 See, e.g., Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 413, 103 N.E. 194, 198 (1913) (stating
it would be inequitable if a party purchased property with restriction, then sold it free
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However, these "moral" arguments must be measured against the
"moral" right of privacy in family matters claimed by the noncon-
formist, as well as against other policy concerns.
c. Freedom of Choice
Real covenants express the voluntary choices of the parties. They
allow an individual to control her environment and achieve some degree
of personal autonomy in a world where the individual is often con-
fronted by external pressures. Thus, real covenants should be enforced
as a general matter to permit this self-fulfillment. This is part of the
concept of freedom of contract.
Many owners view single family restrictions as a personal choice
designed to support traditional family life. Their choice reflects a com-
mon belief that the family is important to bring personal development
and fulfillment,54 to sustain society by inculcating values and norms,
and to socialize the next generation.55 The cases indicate that owners of
lots benefitted by such restrictions seek a certain neighborhood "charac-
ter,"56 "integrity and tranquility."" They believe that this arrangement
can help "impart strong values." 8 Owners fear that nontraditional
family uses may cause "an annoyance and a nuisance, ' 59 and seek to
"prevent flexibility by ascribing a fixed, unambiguous definition" to
single family use.60 For many courts single family use restrictions
should be enforced since they "were important" 61 to the benefitted own-
of restriction for higher price); Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N.J. Eq. 181, 187-88, 147 A. 390,
393 (1929) ("[I]t would be unfair to permit one, who had bought presumably at a
lower price because of the imposed restrictive covenant, to make a profit by selling at a
higher price clear of the restriction.").
54 See WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE, supra note 5, at 80 (80% of survey respon-
dents feel that family is the most, or one of the most, important elements in their lives);
S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, supra note 4, at 12, 20 (stating that young adults indicate
that family life and marriage are two of the most important factors contributing to a
"normal" and "productive" life).
55 S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, supra note 4, at 6.
56 Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1019 n.4 (Okla. 1985).
57 Gregory v. State, 495 A.2d 997, 999 (R.I. 1985).
58 Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 579 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (Countiss, J.,
concurring).
59 Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1019.
60 Craig v. Bossenbery, 134 Mich. App. 543, 351 N.W.2d 596, 599 (1984); accord
Shaver, 626 S.W.2d at 576 ("The clear intent and the plain and unambiguous purpose
expressed in the covenant is to restrict the use of the property to a single family
residence.").
61 Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ind. Ct. App.
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ers when they bought their lots. Moreover, courts should recognize that
people are particularly concerned if rights relating to their homes are
not protected, given the importance of the family home in American
culture and history.62
Protection of the personal choice of the covenanting parties is espe-
cially important when a scheme of reciprocal subdivision covenants is
involved. Each owner receives increased "health, happiness, and peace
of mind" from the arrangement in exchange for submitting to con-
trols. 63 Often, those subdivisions have the additional benefit of demo-
cratic self-determination. 64 The law must protect that choice by the
owners in order to ensure the benefits. 65
However, the difficulties occur when the choice appears to be irra-
tional, such as when fears that residents of a group home for the men-
tally ill will cause disturbances prove unfounded,66 or when the choices
of one person preempt private and personal choices of living arrange-
ments of another. 67 The law must strike a balance in such cases.
2. The Antirestrictions Policy
Courts construing single family use covenants have noted that "it is
in the best interests of society that the free and unrestricted use and
1987).
62 See Kiernan v. Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (upholding
covenants for the benefit of homeowners who, "in reliance upon the protection of the
covenants, established their residences in the locality"); Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d
421, 448, 288 N.W.2d 815, 828 (1980) (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("a home, 'The Ameri-
can Dream' ").
63 Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975).
64 See Korngold, Conservation Servitudes, supra note 34, at 468-69.
65 For cases declaring the benefits of reciprocal subdivision arrangements, see
Swaggerty v. Petersen, 280 Or. 739, 742-43, 572 P.2d 1309, 1312 (1977) (stating
drafters of restriction sought to limit overall density in subdivision); Benton v. Bush,
644 S.W.2d 690, 691-92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that restrictions promoted
uniform development, value of property, and beauty of neighborhood); Davis v. Huey,
620 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1981) (finding restrictions enhance property values and
induce purchasers).
See Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Okla. 1985) (inferring from evi-
dence that home for five mentally handicapped women did not constitute annoyance or
nuisance); Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 579 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (Countiss, J.,
concurring) (stating housemother and three handicapped residents would not interfere
with integrity of neighborhood).
67 It is unclear whether covenantees are really interested in controlling activities
within their homes or fallout from those houses on the rest of the neighborhood. See
infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
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enjoyment of land be encouraged to its fullest extent. ' 6 These state-
ments echo those in other real covenant cases. Usually, this policy is not
explained. The importance of this antirestrictions concern must be un-
derstood to properly analyze single family use servitudes.
a. Marketability
It has been suggested that real covenants should be deterred because
they create problems for the marketability of land. 69 However, as long
as a buyer can discover the restriction through record notice, she can set
her offer accordingly. Thus, she can choose to buy subject to a single
family use restriction at a price presumably below that of unencum-
bered title. If she seeks to use the land free of the covenant, she may
attempt to buy the covenantee's rights. Transaction costs necessary to
locate the covenantee - a prerequisite to bargaining - should not be
great since family use covenants are appurtenant and the benefitted
neighboring owners can easily be found. 70 While there may be difficul-
ties in actually reaching an agreement, especially in a subdivision con-
text when there are many covenantees, theoretically resolution is just a
matter of the buyer offering enough consideration. Concerns about
marketability, therefore, do not adequately explain the antirestrictions
policy. 71
b. Dead Hand Control
The antirestrictions policy, however, is justified by another important
consideration - limitation of the power of the dead hand. Covenants
created today will bind future generations owning the property, per-
haps in perpetuity. This can be harmful in two ways.
68 J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc., 302 N.C. 64,
70-71, 274 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1981); accord Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence County Ass'n
for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 407, 408 (Mo. 1986); Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis.
2d 421, 435, 288 N.W.2d 815, 823 (1980).
69 See C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS THAT "RUN WITH
LAND" 72 (2d ed. 1947).
70 Appurtenant covenants and easements benefit and attach to a piece of land. In
gross interests are held by the person, without reference to a benefitted parcel. See 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.32 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF PROPERTY §§ 453-454 (1944). A distance of three blocks between the benefitted
and burdened parcels may prevent a burden from running. See Stegall v. Housing Au-
thority, 278 N.C. 95, 178 S.E.2d 824 (1971); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §
537 comment f, illustration 4 (1944).
1 If single family use restrictions were held in gross, there may be serious marketa-
bility issues. See Korngold, Unjfing Servitudes, supra note 34, 543-44.
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First, old ties can prevent current owners from shifting the use of
their land to meet contemporary needs of the public which are ex-
pressed through the marketplace. This restraint frustrates the societal
goal of efficient use of our limited land resources. For example, as the
size of traditional families decreases,72 should single family use restric-
tions be enforced to prevent owners from filling excess space in their
homes with other people? 73 As housing becomes scarcer, should people
be prevented from making arrangements for the limited amount of shel-
ter by application of these covenants ?74 Should people be prevented
from banding together to purchase housing that they individually could
not afford? 75 The Rule Against Perpetuities does not literally apply to
real covenants, 76 but we should not ignore its lesson that longstanding
ties on land can have harmful effects on society's efficient allocation of
resources.
77
Dead hand control has a second deleterious effect. When a court en-
forces a servitude it frustrates the aspirations and personal autonomy of
the current owner and imposes the vision of a past generation. One
dissenting judge noted that the majority's decision in determining that a
single family use covenant required an injunction barring two unre-
72 See supra notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text.
73 See POPULATION REFERENCE, supra note 5, at 7 (indicating that today, people
are reaching the "empty nest" stage earlier, thus the single family home has less ap-
peal); Shaman, On Long Island: The War on Illegal Accessory Rentals, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 14, 1986, § 8, at 10, col. 1 (describing benefits of illegal accessory apartments in
single dwellings as providing needed housing for the young and revenue for owners).
74 See Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Zimmerman, 333 Il. App. 94, 104, 77 N.E.2d 49, 54
(1947) (recognizing housing shortage in denying possession to landlord for alleged
breach due to occupancy by extended family).
75 See Marino v. Mayor of Norwood, 77 N.J. Super. 587, 594, 187 A.2d 217, 221
(Ct. App. Div. 1963) (holding that people having economic or other reasons for living
together as a "single housekeeping unit" did not violate zoning restriction); People v.
Skidmore, 69 Misc. 2d 320, 322, 329 N.Y.S.2d 881, 883 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (holding that
two individuals - each with their own children - who "for economic ...reasons
joined forces" and pooled funds to afford rental - constituted a family within zoning
ordinance).
76 See Browder, supra note 34, at 29-30, 34 nn.87-88, 104.
7 See Copelan v. Acree Oil Co., 249 Ga. 276, 278, 290 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1982) (stat-
ing that former owners should control land use only in severely restricted circum-
stances); In re Turners Crossroad Dev. Co., 277 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Minn. 1979)
("This court has serious reservations about the wisdom of allowing provisions contained
in a 1949 real estate transaction ... to prevent the development of a substantial piece of
real estate in 1978."); Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nine-
teenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985); Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Per-
petuities, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1868-69 (1986).
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lated, male co-owners from living in the property, "would oust one of
the tenants in common from enjoying his own home.178 In an era of
diminishing resources - such as housing - inflicting the wishes of
past owners on present users can be especially onerous. Social discon-
tent may result when the law intrudes into the privacy of people's
homes to enforce the wishes of past owners.
The enforcement of single family use restrictions inflicts not only the
vision but also the values of past generations on future owners. These
servitudes do not allow different behavior, whether it is the "eccentric"
actions of the individual nonconformist or an emerging pattern of con-
duct that is followed by numerous members of the social minority. 79
While the traditional single family was perhaps the norm in earlier
times, social and economic forces have permitted or compelled people to
join together in nontraditional arrangements for living and mutual sup-
port. The law should be careful in denying them self-fulfillment and
imposing a tyranny of the conventional because their neighbors find
them to be out of the ordinary.
Private covenants that barred racial and religious minorities provide
a painful reminder. Were it not for the Supreme Court's stretch to find
state action,80 these covenants expressing the prejudice of past genera-
tions might still be valid even though most in our society have come to
regard private discrimination for personal characteristics to be anath-
ema. To be sure, one's race is immutable while her living choices are
not. Moreover, the law strictly examines racial discrimination unlike
living and quasi-family choices. Still, the lesson remains that the bias of
past generations should not limit choices of current land owners.
Moreover, the value judgments of courts deciding single family use
covenant cases seep into their decisionmaking. In one recent case
prohibiting a group home for mentally retarded children on the
grounds that it was not a "single-family dwelling," the court used judg-
mental terms when it noted that only "normal" and "usual" family
units were permitted.8' Another court barred a group home for four
mentally retarded adults and a counselor from occupying a house, find-
78 Feely v. Birenbaum, 554 S.W.2d 432, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
" For a discussion of changed conditions and relative hardship, see infra note 145.
so See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also infra notes 134-35 and
accompanying text.
81 Evergreen Meadows Homeowners' Ass'n v. Double D Manor, Inc., 743 P.2d 39,
40 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973). For a different attitude, see Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d
1017, 1023 (Okla. 1985) ("When ... the ... covenant ... does not address itself to the
composition of the family, a court is loathe to restrict a family unit to that composed of
persons who are related, one to another, by consanguinity or affinity.").
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ing that they did not comprise a "family.""2 At the same time, though,
the court stated that "the holding does not mean ... that 'three unre-
lated schoolteachers' cannot live together . . . -"I While the court dis-
tinguished the situations on the basis that there is supervision in a
group home, one wonders if the decision really turned on the court's
view that three unrelated schoolteachers are an acceptable deviation
from the single family norm while other nonconventional arrangements
are not.84 Still another court permitted the occupancy by an owner, his
wife, son, and daughter-in-law but prohibited another owner from al-
lowing his three married daughters, two cousins, a niece and their chil-
dren from residing in the home. 5 While the court maintained that it
was concerned with overcrowding, suspicion lingers that the court's
sense of what is "typical" controlled. 6
Finally, using single family use restrictions to control behavior
within the home is especially ironic in light of the forces behind the
development of the single family home model. It is argued that the sin-
gle family home became an ideal in the mid-19th century as part of a
developing concept of family privacy.87 The home was viewed as a spe-
cial refuge from the commercial world where the individual could find
satisfaction. Over time the home has grown into a "self-contained en-
tity," and "familial privacy has become an increasingly important
theme." 8 The internal privacy of the single family home, not the purity
of the neighborhood, has been key. It thus seems strange to use cove-
nants designed to support single dwellings to interfere in the home of a
nonconformist.
3. Making an Accommodation
How then can these problems of dead hand control be harmonized
with the efficiency and freedom of choice benefits of covenants? These
values can best be accommodated by a rule that allows enforcement of a
82 Omega Corp. v. Malloy, 228 Va. 12, 319 S.E.2d 728 (1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1192 (1985).
83 Id. at 18, 319 S.E.2d at 731.
84 This might also explain why some courts permit boarders and lodgers. See, e.g.,
Southampton Civic Club v. Couch, 159 Tex. 464, 468, 322 S.W.2d 516, 519 (1958)
(permitting owners of homes restricted to single family residences to rent rooms).
85 Kiernan v. Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898-99 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
86 Certainly the court was not suggesting that a "traditional" single family with
many children would be prohibited because of overcrowding.
87 M. GORDON, supra note 4, at 66-68.
88 Id. at 68. See generally Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis.
L. REV. 1135 (1985) (discussing the family's public and private elements).
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servitude only to the extent that it regulates external behavior of a cur-
rent owner rather than her status or private conduct (and measures that
external behavior by objective, nonnormative criteria). Thus, restric-
tions that control the harmful spillovers of an owner's use on the rest of
the neighborhood should generally be valid, provided that they are lim-
ited only to negative effects that are projected beyond the borders of the
property (e.g., noise, parking) rather than the personal choices which
take place within the home. 9 The rule would protect the tranquility of
the neighborhood, reinforcing the contract benefits of servitudes, but
would not impose the past generation's values.90 It would also recognize
the new pluralistic nature of American families and households.91
It is true that not all contract benefits of covenants would be secured
under this rule. For example, it would not protect a desire to shield
one's family from "immoral" or "different" behavior that might be tak-
ing place in the privacy of the next house. Nor would it permit the
creation of a certain "moral ambience" 92 in the neighborhood. The need
to limit the dead hand, however, trumps these wishes to install norma-
tive controls. Moreover, the fact that there are not many reported cases
challenging nontraditional living arrangements, such as unmarried peo-
ple living together, may indicate that covenantees are indeed mostly
89 See Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 433, 288 N.W.2d 815, 821 (1980) (stat-
ing that neighbors were initially concerned residents of group home for mentally re-
tarded adults would create "a common law nuisance or be an annoyance" but uncon-
tradicted evidence showed that this did not actually occur).
90 A few courts have been sensitive to this distinction. See, e.g., Knudtson v.
Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 658, 345 N.W.2d 4, 7 (1984) (" 'From the outside, the home
looks like all other single family homes in the neighborhood.'" (quoting Costley v.
Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21, 27 (Minn. 1981))); Gregory v. State, 495 A.2d
997, 1002 (R.I. 1985) ("carrying on the day-to-day activities of all the other homes");
see also Pierce v. Harper, 311 Mo. 301, 304, 278 S.W. 410, 411 (1925) (defendants
claimed that "there are no outward signs of any kind by which any person could know
to what uses said premises are being put."). For zoning cases recognizing the distinc-
tion, see City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 11. 2d 432, 438, 216 N.E.2d 116, 120
(1966) (rejecting "zoning ordinances that penetrate so deeply ...into the internal
composition of a single housekeeping unit."); Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313
N.W.2d 21, 23 (Minn. 1981) ("From the exterior, the building would be indistinguish-
able from any other single-family building in the subdivision.").
91 See S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, supra note 4, at viii ("Whether or not society is
better off because of the new sexual and household freedoms depends . . .on personal
value judgments. However, the ability to turn the clock back to an older, dominant
family structure does not appear to be in the offing.").
92 Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing
Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 194 (1977-78)
(discussing zoning restrictions on family use).
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concerned with objective, external effects and not what goes on inside
the covenantor's home. 3 "Single family use" might just be a very rough
way of expressing the expectation that the use of the house should not
create more fallout in the neighborhood than would the use by a tradi-
tional family. 94
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court on zoning ordi-
nances restricting occupancy to a single family seem at odds with this
proposed rule but ultimately support it. Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas and Moore v. City of East Cleveland indicate that governmen-
tal regulation of living arrangements of families will receive strict scru-
tiny, while those of unrelated people will not.95 Rather, nonfamily liv-
ing arrangements must defer to the legislature's power to "lay out
zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet se-
clusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. '96 Arguably
this means that the courts should also defer to similar private choices
created by covenants.
But there are two critical reasons why private controls over unrelated
people should be closely scrutinized. First, servitudes are perpetual.
Zoning legislation can be changed through the democratic process to
meet new needs and views. There is no such flexibility with dead hand
control. Second, zoning controlling nonfamily living relationships will
not be upheld if there is no rational relationship between the legislation
and a legitimate state objective. 97 For example, zoning restrictions on
group homes for the mentally ill have been struck as being based on
"mere negative attitudes or fear" 98 and "irrational prejudice." 99 Real
93 The great number of challenges to group homes, see infra note 100, might be
due to people's (unfounded) fears about the handicapped.
94 See Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d at 437, 216 N.E.2d at 119 (rejecting view that limiting
family to relationships may be thought to limit intensity of use and control traffic and
parking problems). The court stated: "But none of these observations reflects a univer-
sal truth. Family groups are mobile today, and not all family units are internally stable
and well-disciplined. Family groups with two or more cars are not unfamiliar." Id.
95 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977).
96 Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9.
97 Id. at 8. Moreover, zoning ordinances have tended to include groups other than
traditional families within their definition of "family." See, e.g., Oliver v. Zoning
Comm'n, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 205, 326 A.2d 841, 845 (1974) (defining family as "one
or more persons occupying the premises as a single housekeeping unit"); Town of Ith-
aca v. Lucente, 36 A.D.2d 560, 560, 317 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (1971) (same).
98 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
99 Id. at 450.
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covenants law has no parallel doctrine. Thus, dead hand concerns must
be given effect through other means.
II. SINGLE FAMILY USE COVENANT CASES
The courts' decisions in single family use restrictions cases must be
analyzed to determine whether they strike an appropriate balance be-
tween freedom of contract and the antirestrictions policy. The courts
have typically decided the cases based on narrow constructional devices,
rather than by articulating and addressing the policy issues. As a result,
courts provide little guidance on how to resolve the truly difficult case
where the covenant not only clearly limits occupancy to one family but
also expressly defines "family" to include only a "traditional" nuclear
family.
In recent years, much of the single family use litigation has involved
group homes for the mentally and developmentally handicapped, with
the decisions going both ways. °°Restrictions have also been applied to
bar two unrelated male co-owners,10' a group home for elderly citi-
zens,102 members of religious orders, 03 and eight college students. 104
While there are no reported decisions regarding other types of non-
traditional living arrangements, the language of the covenants and ex-
isting holdings raise significant doubts as to their viability.
100 Cases prohibiting such homes include Evergreen Meadows Homeowners' Ass'n
v. Double D Manor, Inc., 743 P.2d 39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Adult Group Properties,
Ltd., v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); London v. Handicapped Facilities
Bd., 637 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1981); Omega Corp. v. Malloy, 228 Va. 12, 319 S.E.2d 728 (1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985). Contra Craig v. Bossenbery, 134 Mich. App. 543, 351
N.W.2d 596 (1984); Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens,
707 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. 1986); Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island
County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, 460 N.E.2d 1336, cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 804 (1984); Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1985); Crowley
v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 42, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980). See generally Brussack, Group
Homes, Families, and Meaning in the Law of Subdivision Covenants, 16 GA. L. REV.
33 (1981) (discussing group homes for disabled individuals).
101 See, e.g., Feely v. Birenbaum, 554 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
102 See, e.g., Jayno Heights Landowners Ass'n v. Preston, 85 Mich. App. 443, 271
N.W.2d 268 (1978).
103 See, e.g., Simons v. Work of God Corp., 36 I11. App. 2d 199, 183 N.E.2d 729
(1962); Cash v. Catholic Diocese, 414 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
104 See, e.g., McCord v. Pichel, 35 A.D.2d 879, 315 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1970).
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A. Use or Structure Restriction
A number of courts avoid the issue of the validity of limitations on
occupants by construing the covenant as restricting only the types of
structures allowed on the premises rather than who may use or occupy
it.O5 These cases usually rely on a fair reading of language such as "no
structure shall be erected other than a single family dwelling" to reach
this result. 0 6 The courts also use narrow construction principles. 07
However, other courts do not avoid the problem of single family use
covenants through construction. For example, some hold that language
seemingly referring only to structures does indeed restrict the use of the
property. 108 Additionally, some courts hold that a limitation on struc-
tures also restricts use. 09
Therefore, interpretative techniques may not always provide a way
out of difficulty of the enforceability of single family use covenants.
Certainly, when the covenant makes it explicit that occupancy and use
105 See, e.g., Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 707
S.W.2d 407 (Mo. 1986); Knudtson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 345 N.W.2d 4 (1984);
J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc., 302 N.C. 64, 274
S.E.2d 174 (1981); Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1985).
106 See, e.g., Blevins, 707 S.W.2d at 407 ("no buildings shall be erected . . . other
than single or double family dwellings"); Knudtson, 216 Neb. at 658-59, 345 N.W.2d
at 7 ("no structures or buildings shall be erected ... other than one detached single
family dwelling" (quoting Malcolm v. Shamie, 290 N.W.2d 101, 102 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980))); Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1021 ("[a] building, other than a mobile home, contain-
ing one dwelling unit designed for occupancy by not more than one family.").
107 See, e.g., Blevins, 707 S.W.2d at 410.
108 See, e.g., Evergreen Meadows Homeowners' Ass'n v. Double D Manor, Inc.,
743 P.2d 39, 40 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) ("All sites shall be for residential use only, with
only one single-family dwelling permitted on any site."); Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d
574, 576 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) ("residential purposes only" construed to mean single
family use); Omega Corp. v. Malloy, 228 Va. 12, 15, 319 S.E.2d 728, 729 (1984)
("one detached single-family dwelling"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985).
109 See, e.g., Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential Sys. Co., 84 Mich. App. 554,
269 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1978) (stating that restrictive covenant applies not only to phys-
ical construction, but also to actual use); Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long
Island County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 159, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1338, 472
N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 804 (1984); McCord v. Pichel, 35
A.D.2d 879, 880, 315 N.Y.S.2d 717, 719 (1970) (same); Kiernan v. Snowden, 123
N.Y.S.2d 895, 898-99 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (same).
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are restricted,110 the conflict between contract and antirestriction consid-
erations must be faced.
B. Construction Norms
When courts must decide what is a "family" under a single family
use clause and the term is not defined in the covenant, they often resort
to constructional devices. Some courts take the view that the failure to
define "family" requires an expansive reading of the word, noting that
the parties must expressly provide a more restrictive meaning."1'
However, other courts use the "ordinary and popular"' 2 meaning of
the term family when it is not defined, and include only "traditional"
families." 3 Other constructional devices favor traditional families over
alternative arrangements. For example, some courts look to the subse-
quent behavior of the covenanting parties to understand what is meant
by "family." This approach is likely to reinforce the majority's tradi-
tional position against nonconformists." 4 Additionally, some courts in-
sist that they must look to the meaning of "family" as of the time the
covenant was written,"' with the effect that the older the covenant, the
110 See, e.g., Craig v. Bossenbery, 134 Mich. App. 543, 351 N.W.2d 596, 597 n.1
(1984) ("[Sluch dwellings shall be ... occupied by only one (1) single family.");
London v. Handicapped Facilities Bd., 637 S.W.2d 212, 214 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
("No more than one family shall live in any residence."); Feely v. Birenbaum, 554
S.W.2d 432, 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (prohibiting "use . .. by more than one
family").
"I See, e.g., Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, 358 So. 2d 1084, 1087 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (" 'Substantial ambiguity or doubt must be resolved against the
person claiming the right to enforce the covenant.' " (quoting Moore v. Stephens, 90
Fla. 879, 106 So. 901, 904 (1925))); Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Okla.
1985) (stating that when composition of family is not addressed, court is loathe to re-
strict its meaning); Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 427, 288 N.W.2d 815, 823
(1980) (same).
112 London, 637 S.W.2d at 215.
113 See, e.g., Evergreen Meadows Homeowners' Ass'n v. Double D Manor, Inc.,
743 P.2d 39, 40 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (stating that since "single-family dwelling" is
not specifically defined, it should retain its traditional definition); London, 637 S.W.2d
at 215 (stating that the court should give the terms used their ordinary meaning in the
context of their usage); Feely, 554 S.W.2d at 435 (same).
114 See, e.g., Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 467 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987) (finding fact that traditional families occupied 34 of 35 lots in restricted
subdivision indicates the intent of the original covenanting parties).
115 See, e.g., Feely, 554 S.W.2d 432 (1914 purchaser and suit brought in 1971);
McCord v. Pichel, 35 A.D.2d 879, 880, 315 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (1970) (stating that
developer did not mean eight or nine unrelated students when it imposed the "family"
restriction).
19891
University of California, Davis
more traditional the definition. This is a dubious position since it ig-
nores the intent of the covenantor's successor even though for other
purposes we treat her as a contracting party."16
C. Defining "Family"
After declaring constructional ground rules, the courts then define
"family." One group of courts adopts a narrow articulation, limiting a
family to "persons related by blood, marriage or adoption.""' 7 Some
restrict the group almost to a nuclear family, allowing only "a father,
mother, children and immediate blood relatives.""18 These courts note
that while other groupings share "indicia of family life" 119 and may do
some things that families do, this does not make them a family. 20
In many respects these definitions are accurate descriptions of the
"traditional" family.' 2' Their use would help preserve traditional fam-
ily neighborhoods, effectuating the choice of the covenanting parties.
However, some of the definitions, such as those limiting collateral rela-
tives, are overly restrictive in light of historical norms. 22 Moreover,
some of the definitions are outdated as descriptions of the current
"traditional" family. For example, the requirement that a "family"
have a "single head or management' 2 23 seems inapplicable today to
even a "traditional" family in light of the legal and social empower-
116 The successor demonstrates her intent by purchasing with notice of the cove-
nant. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
17 Feely, 554 S.W.2d at 435; accord London, 637 S.W.2d at 215; Omega Corp. v.
Malloy, 228 Va. 12, 18, 319 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192
(1985); Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 442, 288 N.W.2d 815, 825 (1980) (Day,
J., dissenting); Contra Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Okla. 1985).
11I Imler, 505 N.E.2d at 466. There is a debate over whether extended families are
permitted. Compare Kiernan v. Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898-99 (Sup. Ct. 1953)
(barring extended family of owner's married children, niece and cousin) with Shaver v.
Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (resisting limitation to the nuclear
family).
119 Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61
N.Y.2d 154, 159, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1338, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 804 (1984).
120 Crowley, 94 Wis. 2d at 443, 288 N.W.2d at 826 (Day, J., dissenting). The
courts have also looked at various factors present in the group to distinguish it from a
family. See, e.g., Omega, 228 Va. at 18, 319 S.E.2d at 731 (element of supervision in a
group home for the mentally retarded).
121 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
122 See supra note 10 (extended family has recently become less prevalent).
123 Kiernan v. Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895, 899 (Sup. Ct. 1953); see also Steva v.
Steva, 332 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Mo. 1960) ("one head and one domestic government,"
quoted in Feely v. Birenbaum, 554 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)).
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ment of women. 124 Finally, these articulations do not reflect the evolv-
ing nature of the family and modern alternative living and support
mechanisms.
Other courts have more broadly defined the term "family" by using
functional rather than kinship tests.125 Several types of broad definitions
emerge. The first focuses on the outward manifestations of the group
living together. Thus, one court held that a family is "a group of people
who live, sleep, work and eat upon the premises as a single housekeep-
ing unit" and no relationship is necessary. 26 This very broad articula-
tion would include many types of groups. A second categorization re-
quires that the group's structure and obligations mirror the ideal
traditional family. One court defined a family "as a collective body of
persons under one head and one domestic government, who have recip-
rocal, natural, or moral, duties to support and care for each other.' 27
This articulation is broader than the traditional family definition, in-
cluding, for example an unmarried couple, but may not be large
enough to encompass a group of college students living together. A
third description demands that the group have traditional family values
and feelings, defining a family as "a stable housekeeping unit of two or
more persons who are emotionally attached to each other and share a
relationship that emulates traditional family values, promotes mutual
protection, support, happiness, physical well-being and intellectual
growth and is not in violation of the penal laws.' 28 If single, family use
restrictions are limited to controlling the external negative effects of a
group on the neighborhood, as opposed to creating a certain moral at-
mosphere, the first of these three broader definitions is all that is
needed to accomplish that goal.
D. Policy Bases
While most courts decide the validity of single family use restrictions
on a constructional and definitional level, a few courts rely on public
124 See Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 77, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 247
(1962) (rejecting head of household requirement in zoning case); see also supra note 8
and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 4.
126 Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 437, 288 N.W.2d 815, 823 (1980); accord
Knudtson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 658, 345 N.W.2d 4, 7 (1984) ("family-type set-
ting and- call the dwelling their home").
127 Steva, 332 S.W.2d at 926-27.
128 Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 579 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (Countiss, J.,
concurring).
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policy to void application of these covenants to group homes for the
mentally and developmentally handicapped. These courts find that en-
forcement of the covenant would frustrate specific statutory or state
constitutional provisions favoring group homes and so the covenant
must fall.1 29 However, these cases are not very helpful when the non-
traditional family arrangement is not endorsed by such a specific legis-
lative provision.' 3°
There also is a vast group of cases describing and extolling "family"
in contexts other than single family use restrictions. 3' But a favorable
quotation broadly defining "family" in another context will likely not
provide a sufficient basis for a court to void a single family use cove-
nant as being offensive to public policy.3 2 This Article has suggested a
more precise, and long respected, policy basis - the contracts/an-
tirestrictions conflict - as a means of analyzing the issue.
E. Constitutional Challenges
Some courts suggest that the United States Constitution might bar
the application of single family use covenants against certain nontradi-
tional family arrangements.'33 However, these positions are extremely
129 See, e.g., Craig v. Bossenbery, 134 Mich. App. 543, 351 N.W.2d 596, 599
(1984); Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61
N.Y.2d 154, 160, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1339, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 804 (1984).
130 For statutes that void covenants barring group homes, see IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-13-21-14 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 89.020(3) (Vernon Supp.
1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 46.03(22)(d) (West 1987).
131 See 16 WORDS AND PHRASES 302-62 (West 1959 & Supp. 1988).
132 For example, courts differ on the issue of whether zoning decisions defining
"family" are relevant to servitude cases. For examples of cases supporting the use of
zoning definitions, see Knudtson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 658, 345 N.W.2d 4, 7
(1984); Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 437, 288 N.W.2d 815, 823 (1980); see also
McMillan v. Iserman, 120 Mich. App. 785, 327 N.W.2d 559, 565-66 (1982) (Allen,
J., dissenting) (holding policy that invalidates zoning restriction is inapplicable to cove-
nants); J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc., 302 N.C. 64,
71, 274 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1981) (holding restrictions enforced if they "do not offend
articulated considerations of public policy") (emphasis added). Contra Feely v. Biren-
baum, 554 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (refusing to apply policy of zoning
ordinance to private covenant); Crane Neck Ass'n, 61 N.Y.2d at 159-60, 460 N.E.2d at
1338-39, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904 (distinguishing zoning ordinance decisions and policies
from those affecting private covenants).
33 See, e.g., Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1023 n.24, (Okla. 1985) (unmar-
ried persons living together); Crowley, 94 Wis. 2d at 437 n.2, 288 N.W.2d at 823 n.2.
In related cases, a few courts have found covenants that prohibit children to be uncon-
stitutional. See, e.g., Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974); Franklin
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doubtful. First, it is unlikely that the courts will find state action and
extend Shelley v. Kraemer134 beyond racial covenants. 135 Moreover,
even assuming state action were found, courts use strict scrutiny only
with restrictions against relatives living together. 36 Courts will test lim-
itations on living arrangements of unrelated people only for a rational
relationship, and they likely will sustain the limitation. 37
III. RESOLVING THE DIFFICULT CASE
These decided cases, marked by interpretative devices, occasional ref-
erence to a specific state policy, and a failure to articulate and examine
the contracts/antirestrictions debate, are of little assistance in resolving
the difficult case when a group of people living together does not fall
within the covenant's express definition of permissible occupants. 38 As
suggested earlier, the competing policy concerns can be best accommo-
dated by enforcing servitudes only to the extent that they limit spill-
overs projected from the property rather than the owner's status or pri-
vate choices on the land. This rule might regulate behavior such as
excessive noise,139 traffic congestion, 40 and overcrowding.' 4 ' Whether
occupancy could be limited to a single housekeeping unit is
problematic. 42
v. White Egret Condominium, 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
1- 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
135 See Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 465 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987); Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1023 n.24; Travalio, Suffer the Little Children - But
Not in My Neighborhood: A Constitutional View of Age-Restrictive Housing, 40 OHIO
ST. L.J. 295, 324-34 (1979).
136 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
137 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974).
138 See, e.g., Craig v. Bossenbery, 134 Mich. App. 543, 351 N.W.2d 596, 597 n.1
(1984) ("[D]wellings shall be ... occupied by only one (1) single family .... A family
shall mean one person or a group of two or more persons living together and inter-
related by bonds of consanquinity (sic), marriage, or legal adoption."); McMillan v.
Iserman, 120 Mich. App. 785, 327 N.W.2d 559, 560 (1982) (covenant expressly bar-
ring group homes as defined in statute).
139 See Gallon v. Hussar, 172 A.D. 393, 396-97, 158 N.Y.S. 895, 898 (1916). One
court has noted that "groups of college students are for the most part exuberant, bois-
terous and hilarious, use vibrant . . . instruments, and do not ordinarily keep regular
hours." Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Ky. Ct. App.
1954).
140 See McCord v. Pichel, 35 A.D.2d 879, 880, 315 N.Y.S.2d 717, 719 (1970).
141 See Kiernan v. Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
142 It has been asserted that a "single housekeeping unit" limitation is designed to
prevent overcrowding, see, e.g., Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 84
A.2d 687, 691 (1951), and may also improve neighborhood relations by helping to keep
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Well-drafted covenants should expressly articulate the behavior that
is being controlled. Courts should interpret covenants that refer only to
"single family use" and do not describe activities as permitting the
owner to project on the neighborhood only the types and amount of
fallout that a "reasonable" single family would. 143 In this way a "single
family use" servitude retains meaning and validity.
There may be some uncertainty as to which living arrangements and
quasi-families are permitted under such a rule, arguably creating some
disincentive to entering into servitude arrangements. However, the un-
certainty seems no greater than the current confusion over the enforce-
ment of single family use servitudes. 44 Moreover, the importance of
limiting the dead hand outweighs the harm due to lack of
predictability.
The approach suggested in this Article can be implemented under
existing real covenants law through the touch and concern test and the
rule barring enforcement of covenants violating public policy. 45 It
out transients. These may, however, be too intrusive in the internal composition of the
house.
143 Some courts have indicated that refusal to enforce a single family use covenant
would violate the contracts clause of the United States Constitution, article I, § 10. See,
e.g., Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); see
also Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 446, 288 N.W.2d 815, 827 (1980) (Day, J.,
dissenting) (speculating whether a statute voiding covenants barring group homes for
the disabled can be applied retroactively). Other theories that deny enforcement of a
covenant (such as changed conditions doctrine, see infra note 145) usually do so be-
cause of the presumed intent of the parties not to enforce under the circumstances, see,
e.g., Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101 (1927), and so do not present the
contracts clause problem. The view that nonenforcement of a single family use clause
creates a constitutional problem has been rejected on the theory that contracts can be
impaired through "social welfare legislation" which is "reasonably necessary to further
an important public purpose and that the measures taken . . . are reasonable and ap-
propriate to effectuate the purpose." Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island
County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 167, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1343, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901,
908, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 804 (1984). But see Barret v. Lipscomb, 194 Cal. App. 3d
1524, 1533, 240 Cal. Rptr. 336, 342 (1987) (refusing to apply retroactively statute
voiding covenants limiting group homes). In Crane Neck there was a specific statute
endorsing group homes; in other situations involving nontraditional living arrangements
there is likely no specific statutory support. Courts typically void contracts that offend
public policy without even raising the contracts clause issue and even though no specific
statutory policy exists. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, at §§ 5.2-.6.
14 See Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v. Paulist Fathers, Inc., 306 Mich. 253, 258,
10 N.W.2d 847, 849 (1943). ("It is obvious that each case involving the construction of
reciprocal negative easements must be decided on its merits, considering the facts of the
case.").
145 The doctrines of changed conditions and relative hardship would not be gener-
[Vol. 22:951
Single Family Use Covenants
should also be reflected in the unified law of servitudes that is currently
being articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Property -
Servitudes.
46
A. Touch and Concern
The touch and concern test traditionally limits the subject matter of
real covenants. 147 Although the test is difficult to articulate, classically a
covenant touches and concerns if it burdens the promisor in his capacity
as a landowner and benefits the promisee in the same capacity, rather
than being a benefit or burden unrelated to the enjoyment of the
land. 14
Professor Reichman has developed a touch and concern formulation
that would permit enforcement only of servitudes "that are objectively
intended to promote land utilization.' 1 49 The formulation bars servi-
tudes attempting to enforce "ideologically prescribed modes of behav-
ior" as they would permit the imposition of "modern variations of feu-
dal serfdom."' 50  Professor Reichman's test achieves the policy
accommodation suggested above by preserving the benefits of freedom
of contract but, at the same time, limiting the reach of the dead hand.
If courts applied this touch and concern test to single family use cov-
enants they would reach the result suggested in this Article. Personal
choices within the homes could not be regulated, while objective, dis-
turbing actions outside the home that affect the neighborhood could be
ally helpful to attack application of single family use restrictions to nontraditional liv-
ing arrangements. The changed conditions rule would void only obsolete restrictions,
see Korngold, Unifying Servitudes, supra note 34, at 557-58, while in the view of the
majority, the single family restriction would still be valuable. The relative hardship
doctrine would bar only equitable enforcement of the servitude, leaving the nontradi-
tional homeowner liable to his neighbors for damages. See Korngold, Conservation Ser-
vitudes, supra note 34, at 486-89.
146 See French, Design Proposal, supra note 34.
,47 The necessity for the touch and concern requirement has been questioned lately.
See Epstein, supra note 34, at 1360 (rejecting the test as intrusion on free choice);
French, Design Proposal, supra note 34, at 1220 n.18 (noting cases); French, Modern
Law of Servitudes, supra note 34, at 1308 (suggesting increased use of modification
doctrines rather than touch and concern rule).
148 C. CLARK, supra note 69, at 99; Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases,
12 MIcH. L. REV. 639, 645 (1913-14). Other statements of the rule appear at 2 AMER-
ICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 378-83 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 5 R. POWELL AND P.
ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 673[2][a] (1981).
14' Reichman, Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 150
(1978).
150 Reichman, supra note 34, at 1233.
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prevented.
Surprisingly, none of the cases involving single family use restrictions
cited in this Article raises the touch and concern issue. Indeed, they
usually do not indicate that the case involves real covenants but address
it as a simple contract action.'51 To be sure, the touch and concern test
has its flaws. Most notably, it is only a rough vehicle for addressing the
contracts/antirestrictions conflict and does not straightforwardly ex-
amine the issues. Rather, it forces the problem into an arcane frame-
work replete with jargon. The touch and concern test needs to be refor-
mulated or replaced in a modern law of servitudes.'52 However, it is
better than nothing when it comes to single family use covenants.
B. Covenants Violating Public Policy
Courts often state that covenants will not be enforced if they violate
public policy.'5 3 Most often, however, these declarations are dicta,54 or
flat assertions that the covenant in question does not offend public pol-
icy.155 Few cases make a detailed analysis of the policy issue. 156
Even fewer cases actually refuse enforcement of a servitude on the
grounds that public policy is offended. Those that do usually rely on a
conflict between the covenant and an express statutory provision 57 or a
"I' It is unclear why this is so. It may be that traditional use covenants, such as
limitations to residential purposes only, have been recognized for so long as meeting the
touch and concern test that the courts (mistakenly) assume it is true of all use
restrictions.
152 See Korngold, Unifying Servitudes, supra note 34, at 571-72.
153 See, e.g., Wier v. Isenberg, 95 Ill. App. 3d 839, 842, 420 N.E.2d 790, 793
(1981); Bob Layne Contractors, Inc. v. Buenagel, 158 Ind. App. 43, 53, 301 N.E.2d
671, 678 (1973); Loeb v. Watkins, 428 Pa. 480, 484, 240 A.2d 513, 516 (1968).
154 See, e.g., Vickery v. Powell, 267 S.C. 23, 28, 225 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1976); Huey
v. Davis, 556 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
"I See, e.g., Normandy Square Assocs. v. Ellis, 213 Neb. 60, 64, 327 N.W.2d 101,
104 (1982); Hawthorne v. Realty Syndicate, Inc., 300 N.C. 660, 669, 268 S.E.2d 494,
500 (1980); Sea Pines Plantation Co. v. Wells, 294 S.C. 266, 270-71, 363 S.E.2d 891,
894 (1987).
156 For examples of cases making a detailed policy analysis and upholding the cove-
nant, see Rasp v. Hidden Valley Lake, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 153, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)
(mandatory hook up and fee for water and sewer service); Thayer v. Thompson, 36
Wash. App. 794, 797, 677 P.2d 787, 789 (1984) (covenant barring any building with-
out seller's consent valid because owner could still use the land).
157 See, e.g., Westwood Homeowners Ass'n v. Tenhoff, 155 Ariz. 229, 234, 745
P.2d 976, 981 (Ct. App. 1987) (statute voiding covenants barring group homes for the
developmentally disabled); Hoye v. Shepherds Glen Land Co., 753 S.W.2d 226 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988) (statute voiding covenants that require the use of wood shingle roof);
Overlook Farms Home Ass'n v. Alternative Living Servs., 143 Wis. 2d 485, 489-91,
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longstanding common law policy, such as policies against monopolies, 5 8
restraints on alienation, 59 and limits on access to the courts. 60 None of
these specific policies is offended by enforcement of single family use
covenants against nontraditional living arrangements. However, to the
extent that such covenants violate the public policy favoring the limita-
tion of the dead hand, the general rule could be applied to bar their
enforcement.
C. A Modern Law of Sevitudes
Various commentators argue that a modern law of servitudes should
enforce covenants in the manner of other consensual arrangements
without using a touch and concern test or other device to scrutinize the
substance of the covenant.' 6 1 However, there must be some controls on
the subject matter of real covenants in order to bar enforcement of cove-
nants creating dead hand problems or eccentric limitations. Rather than
using the flawed touch and concern test, courts could specifically ex-
amine the contracts/antirestrictions dichotomy and evolve rules dealing
with difficult types of covenants. Thus, courts could expressly examine
a particular single family use covenant and the facts in light of the
policy analysis suggested in this Article and determine whether, and
what aspects of, the covenant should be enforced. The Restatement
(Third) of Property - Servitudes could provide for such a review in a
section specifically dealing with the subject matter of servitudes or as
part of the doctrine barring enforcement of servitudes violating public
policy.
IV. ZONING FOR SINGLE FAMILY USE AND PRIVATE AGE
RESTRICTIONS
Zoning for single family use and private age restriction covenants
raises some of the issues inherent in single family use servitudes. They
422 N.W.2d 131, 134 (1988) (statute voiding covenants barring group homes for the
mentally disabled).
158 See, e.g., Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 92, 390 N.E.2d 243,
250 (1979); Hall v. American Oil Co., 504 S.W.2d 313, 319 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973);
DeBlois v. Crosley Bldg. Corp., 117 N.H. 626, 629, 376 A.2d 143, 145 (1977).
119 See, e.g., Tuckerton Beach Club v. Bender, 91 N.J. Super. 167, 170, 219 A.2d
529, 531 (1966); Mountain Springs Ass'n v. Wilson, 81 N.J. Super. 564, 574-75, 196
A.2d 270, 276 (1963).
1o See, e.g., Fugazzoto v. Brookwood One, 295 Ala. 169, 173, 325 So. 2d 161, 164
(1976).
161 See supra note 147.
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provide a useful lens for analyzing single family use covenants. More-
over, they aid in understanding the larger issue posed in this Article -
how real property law in the late twentieth century views the family.
A. Zoning Restrictions on Single Family Use
Various zoning ordinances limit occupancy to single family use. It is
noteworthy that many nontraditional arrangements that are barred
under many private covenants are permitted under zoning. This is due
to broader definitions of "family" in many of these ordinances, more
flexible judicial interpretation, and constitutional limitations not pre-
sent in most private covenants. Thus, public law often demonstrates a
more flexible and broad concept of the family than does the law of
servitudes, and so places fewer limitations on the ability of nonfamily
groups to obtain housing. 61
1. Legislative Definitions and Judicial Interpretation
Many of the express definitions of "family" in zoning laws include,
and thus authorize, many living arrangements besides the traditional
family. Numerous ordinances expressly define a family simply as a
group of people living as a "single housekeeping unit," without any
further requirement such as relationship. 163 Additionally, many ordi-
nances that limit family to blood, marital or adoptive relationships ex-
pressly provide that a limited number of individuals without such a
relationship are also deemed a family. 64
In applying the "single housekeeping unit" definition, the courts
162 For discussions of zoning restrictions to single family use, see Babcock, The
Egregious Invalidity of the Exclusive Single-Family Zone, 6 URB. L. & PoL'Y 185
(1983); Scott, A Psycho-social Analysis of the Concept of Family as Used in Zoning
Laws, 88 DICK. L. REV. 368 (1984); Ziegler, The Twilight of Single-Family Zoning, 3
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 161 (1983).
163 See, e.g., Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Minn. 1981);
Saunders v. Clark County Zoning Dep't, 66 Ohio St. 2d 259, 262, 421 N.E.2d 152,
155 (1981). For additional ordinances using the "single housekeeping unit" definition,
see infra notes 165-72 and accompanying text. One commentator has stated that the
majority of ordinances define family in this way. 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF
ZONING §§ 9.29-.30, at 196-98 (3d ed. 1986).
164 See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974) (permitting six
unrelated persons); Hayward v. Gaston, 542 A.2d 760, 768 (Del. 1988) (permitting
four unrelated persons); Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Okla. 1985) (per-
mitting five unrelated persons); cf Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 221 N.J. Super.
610, 612, 535 A.2d 544, 547 (1987) (defining family as "a traditional family unit or
the functional equivalency thereof").
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have refused to imply other requirements unless specified, such as a
relationship by blood, marriage or adoption, 65 numerical limits on the
occupants, 66 or a head of the household. 167 The courts indicate that
they must follow the legislature's intent as expressed by the ordinance,
without further intrusion on the legislative sphere or private action. 168
As a result, courts have found under the "single housekeeping unit"
test that occupancy by four sisters and their children, 69 a group of stu-
dents living in a communal arrangement, 70 a group of religious nov-
ices,' 7' and a group of twenty nurses sharing a house 72 constituted a
"family."
The broad definitions adopted by legislatures, the judicial attitude in
their application, and the case results contrast with single family use
covenants. As discussed above, covenants rarely define family and the
few that do have narrow definitions, often in terms of the traditional
family. 7 3 Thus, many nontraditional arrangements might be permitted
under zoning laws but barred under covenants. The democratic process,
that may account for the legislatures' flexibility in definition, and no-
tions of separation of powers and deference, that may explain the judi-
cial attitude, are not in play with private servitudes.
165 See, e.g., JALC Real Estate Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 104 Pa. Commw.
605, 522 A.2d 710, 712 (1987).
166 See, e.g., Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 203, 326 A.2d 841,
845 (1974).
167 See, e.g., Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 72, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242,
244 (1962).
'6 See, e.g., Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So. 2d 643, 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Linn County v. City of Hiawatha, 311 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Iowa 1981).
169 See, e.g., Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 363, 84 A.2d 687,
691 (1951); cf Prospect Gardens Convalescent Home v. City of Norwalk, 32 Conn.
Supp. 214, 219, 347 A.2d 637, 640-41 (holding unrelated individuals without commu-
nal relationship did not constitute a family).
170 See, e.g., Town of Ithaca v. Lucente, 36 A.D.2d 560, 561, 317 N.Y.S.2d 679,
681 (1971); cf Commonwealth v. Jaffe, 398 Mass. 50, 54-55, 494 N.E.2d 1342, 1345
(1986) (although family was not defined in the ordinance, eight unrelated adults living
together without communal arrangement were not a family).
171 See, e.g., Carroll, 198 So. 2d at 644.
172 See, e.g., Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1954).
173 See, e.g., Craig v. Bossenbery, 134 Mich. App. 543, 351 N.W.2d 596, 597 n.1
(1984) (requiring "consanquinity (sic), marriage, or legal adoption"); McMillan v.
Iserman, 120 Mich. App. 785, 327 N.W.2d 559, 562 (1982) (Mackenzie, J., concur-
ring) (expressly excluding group homes as a family); see also supra notes 117-20 and
accompanying text.
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2. Constitutional Protections
Zoning, unlike single family use covenants, is a governmental action
and subject to constitutional scrutiny. This may provide protections, not
available with private servitudes, to some living arrangements that dif-
fer from traditional, nuclear families.
The first of the important recent Supreme Court cases in the area
was Belle Terre. 7 4 That case involved a challenge, brought by owners
of a house leased to six college students, to a zoning ordinance that
defined family in terms of blood, adoption, or marriage.17 The Court
upheld the ordinance, stating that it was merely economic and social
legislation, not involving a fundamental right. Thus, the Court only
had to find that the statute was not arbitrary or unreasonable and that
it had a rational relationship to a permissible state objective. The Court
stated that it was permissible for the state "to lay out zones where fam-
ily values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean
air make the area a sanctuary for people," and that the Court must
defer to the legislative judgment.17 6
Belle Terre on its face appears to be strong precedent against chal-
lenges to traditional family zoning. 77 The declaration that no funda-
mental right, such as privacy or association, is involved, coupled with
the weak rational relationship test and the deference shown by courts in
applying that test, appears to make successful attacks on such ordi-
nances unlikely. Indeed, courts have followed Belle Terre to enforce
zoning restrictions that limit "family" to blood, marriage or adoption
against nontraditional families, such as an unmarried couple and their
respective children living together'78 and a group home for ten emotion-
ally disturbed juveniles. 7 9
However, Belle Terre may not permit limitations against all non-
traditional family groups. First, some cases distinguish the facts of Belle
Terre that involved college students and the special problems of noise
and crowding which they bring. 80 Thus, even though ten foster chil-
1 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
175 The ordinance also defined two unrelated people to be a family. Id. at 2.
176 Id. at 9.
177 Various ordinances define family only in terms of a blood, marital, or adoptive
relationship and do not provide an exception for a limited number of unmarried people
living together. See, e.g., Zavala v. City of Denver, 759 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1988); City of
Des Plaines v. Trotmer, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966); City of White Plains
v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974).
178 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
179 See, e.g., Hayward v. Gaston, 542 A.2d 760 (Del. 1988).
1SO See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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dren living with their married foster parents did not fall within the
ordinance's definition of family, it could not be enforced against them
since "to all outward appearances [they were] a relatively normal, sta-
ble, and permanent family unit" that had no adverse effect on the
neighborhood.' Another court remanded to determine whether a fun-
damental right was implicated, and strict scrutiny thus required, in the
enforcement of an ordinance limiting "family" to certain relatives
against an unmarried man and woman who were co-owners of a
house. 182 Additionally, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that zon-
ing regulations limiting the ability of related people to live together are
not controlled by Belle Terre but effect fundamental rights that require
strict scrutiny. 83
Second, the Supreme Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center'14 indicated that application of the rational relationship to zon-
ing classifications does not ensure the sustaining of the governmental
action. 85 In that case, the court overturned a city's decision that a
group home for thirteen mentally retarded adults required a special
permit. 86 The Court found that the regulation served no legitimate
public purpose and that it was instead based on "irrational prejudice
against the mentally retarded."'8 7 This case may be helpful to challenge
application of narrow definitions of family against groups that cause no
greater disturbances to a neighborhood than would a traditional family.
Finally, courts have used state constitutions to provide greater pro-
tection to nonfamily groups. 8
181 Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d at 304, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
112 See Zavala v. City of Denver, 759 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1988).
183 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
184 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
185 Id. at 446-50.
186 Id. at 450.
187 Id.
188 See, e.g., Open Door Alcoholism Program, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 200
N.J. Super. 191, 200, 491 A.2d 17, 22 (App. Div. 1985) (finding halfway house for 10
recovering alcoholics not to be a family because of transient nature); State v. Baker, 81
N.J. 99, 108-09, 405 A.2d 368, 372 (1979) (holding that New Jersey Constitution bars
restriction on groups having the "generic character of a family unit as a relatively
permanent household"); McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d
1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985) (finding under New York Constitution no rational
relationship between prohibition of group whicfi is the "functional and factual
equivalent of a natural family" and the goal of controlling traffic, parking, noise and
population density).
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B. Age Restrictions
A number of courts have reviewed the validity of restrictions, created
by private agreements among landowners, on the age of occupants in
subdivisions' 89 and condominiums. 190 These cases are instructive on sev-
eral levels. They demonstrate how courts in the late twentieth century
struggle with conflicting concepts of family and that the resolution of
the conflict directly affects the availability of shelter for families. Sec-
ond, the age restriction cases provide a foil for the evaluation of single
family use covenants and the approach suggested in this Article.,' Fi-
nally, the ultimate resolution of the age restriction issue through federal
legislation may be a unique result not likely to be repeated with restric-
tions on other classes of occupants. 9
1. Case Law
Age restrictions are usually drafted to exclude children, 193 although
some cases have involved prohibitions against persons under thirty' 94 or
forty-five'9" years of age. Bans on children are sought by some elderly
persons and nonelderly single people and childless couples in order to
avoid the noise and disturbances that children might cause. 96
189 See, e.g., Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974).
190 See, e.g., Everglades Plaza Condominium Ass'n v. Buckner, 462 So. 2d 835
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, 358 So. 2d 1084
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Covered Bridge Condominium Ass'n v. Chambliss, 705
S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
191 Although condominium restrictions are imposed in a recorded declaration as au-
thorized by statute, they are analogous to servitudes. Both are private law devices that
impose obligations on land, enforceable against subsequent purchasers with notice. See
Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 987,
1004 (1963).
192 On the topic of age restrictions, see Doyle, Retirement Communities: The Na-
ture and Enforceability of Residential Segregation by Age, 76 MicH. L. REV. 64
(1977); Note, The Necessity for Shelter: States Must Prohibit Discrimination Against
Children in Housing, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 481 (1987); Note, Why Johnny Can't
Rent - An Examination of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination Against Families in
Rental Housing, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1829 (1981).
193 See, e.g., Riley, 22 Ariz. App. at 226, 526 P.2d at 749 (prohibiting residents
under 21 years of age); Constellation Condominium Ass'n v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d
378, 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (prohibiting residents under 12 years of age);
Everglades Plaza, 462 So. 2d 835, 836 (prohibiting residents under 16 years of age).
194 See, e.g., Covered Bridge, 705 S.W.2d 211.
195 See, e.g., Park Redlands Covenant Control Comm. v. Simon, 181 Cal. App. 3d
87, 226 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1986).
196 See Note, Housing Discrimination Against Children: The Legal Status of a
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The courts have most often upheld age restrictions.1 97 In doing so
they make a noteworthy statement about the current status of the tradi-
tional family. As shown earlier, the courts' sustaining of single family
use covenants arguably reinforces traditional family values by preserv-
ing neighborhoods where they can flourish. In contrast, the decisions
upholding age restrictions harm traditional families (which, by most
definitions, are comprised of children 98) by limiting the shelter oppor-
tunities available to them and, at least theoretically, raising the price
for the remaining unrestricted housing. 199 This is troubling given the
large numbers of families with children 2°° and the shortage of decent
and affordable housing.201
The methods and reasoning of the courts have been diverse and often
unsatisfying. A number of courts entertain constitutional attacks, al-
though they ultimately sustain the age restrictions. 2 2 They apparently
make, without much (if any) discussion, the very dubious assumption
Growing Social Problem, 16 J. FAM. L. 559, 561 (1977-1978).
197 See, e.g., Riley, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747; Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Con-
dominium Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978); Roth v. Normandy
Shores Yacht & Country Club, 511 So. 2d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Rocek v.
Markowitz, 492 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Constellation Condominium,
467 So. 2d 378; Everglades Plaza, 462 So. 2d 835; Pacheco v. Lincoln Palace
Condominium, Inc., 410 So. 2d 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Preston Tower
Condominium Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, 685 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). But see
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 320 (1983); Park Redlands, 181 Cal. App. 3d 87, 226 Cal. Rptr. 199.
198 See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
199 The problem of discrimination against children seems most acute in rental hous-
ing. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1158 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1987) [hereafter Fair Housing Hearings] (statement of Pe-
ter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, describing the shortage of
housing for families with children); Schober, Exclusion of Families with Children from
Housing, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1121, 1127-29 (1985). The problem may not be as
great with sales of homes. See Note, supra note 196, at 564 (suggesting that the market
will limit developers' discrimination against children.)
200 See Fair Housing Hearings, supra note 199, at 166 (testimony of David S.
Liederman stating that 73% of households have children).
201 See id. at 372 (testimony of James B. Morales).
202 See, e.g., Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974); Rocek v.
Markowitz, 492 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Preston Tower Condominium
Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, 685 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); see also Franklin v. White
Egret Condominium, 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist.'Ct. App. 1977) (sustaining the re-
striction on equal protection grounds but barring enforcement against the owner on the
theory of selective enforcement).
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that there is adequate state action.2°3 Moreover, the leading case in the
area, Riley v. Stoves,2°4 decided that there was no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. 20 The court found that only a rational relationship
must be established between the restriction and a permissible objec-
tive.206 This reasoning is questionable, however, since the plurality in
Moore207 subsequently indicated that a higher level of scrutiny is re-
quired with zoning restrictions on related persons.208
Other cases scrutinize age restrictions without resorting to constitu-
tional law. California courts have found that age restrictions violated
the state's Civil Rights Act,209 although an exception was made for
housing specifically designed for the elderly.210 Other courts have sus-
tained such restrictions against challenges apparently based on contract
law.
21 1
2. Contracts/Antirestrictions Issues
The cases that sustain age restrictions against constitutional or other
challenges sometimes support their result by alluding to ideas encom-
passed within the freedom of contract concept this Article develops.
Some courts refer to purchasers' reliance on the restriction, evoking the
efficiency theory of the benefits of covenants.212 Moreover, many courts
place weight on the fact that the restriction was recorded, giving the
203 See, e.g., Riley, 22 Ariz. App. at 229, 526 P.2d at 751; Franklin, 379 So. 2d at
349; Travalio, supra note 135, at 324-31 (discussing state action); see also supra notes
134-35 and accompanying text.
204 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974).
205 Id. at 232, 526 P.2d at 753.
206 Id. at 230, 526 P.2d at 752. Similarly, other cases state that such restrictions
will be upheld unless they are unreasonable or arbitrary. See, e.g., Rocek, 492 So. 2d
460; Preston Tower, 685 S.W.2d 98.
207 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
208 For cases rejecting strict scrutiny with age restrictions, see Franklin, 379 So. 2d
at 351; Covered Bridge Condominium Ass'n v. Chambliss, 705 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1985).
209 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d
427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983); Park Redlands Covenant Control Comm. v. Simon,
181 Cal. App. 3d 87, 226 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1986). Contra Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Con-
dominium Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978). These cases apply
the Unruh Civil Rights Act. See generally CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1988).
210 See, e.g., Park Redlands, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 94, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 202 (1986).
211 See, e.g., Constellation Condominium Ass'n v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d 378, 381-
82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (language of rule was unambiguous, restriction was rea-
sonable, rule was understood by owners before purchase).
212 See, e.g., Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 230, 526 P.2d 747, 752 (1974).
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owner notice before he purchased;213 this relates to the moral basis for
enforcement of servitudes. Finally, many courts view age restrictions as
legitimate and beneficial exercises of freedom of choice and find the
restrictions a valid means to provide for the different housing needs of
different age groups. 214
However, there is very little discussion of the antirestrictions policy
in the opinions, which helps to explain why age limitations are given
such little scrutiny. 25 In light of the antirestrictions policy, should age
restrictions be sustained under the test suggested in this Article? On
first glance age restrictions should fall, since they bar people based on
their status, rather than on control of fallout on the neighborhood. Ar-
guably, instead of a per se prohibition on children, there should be
limits on specific disturbing behavior. 216
Yet, on closer analysis, the antirestrictions policy does not compel
that result in all cases. Two reasons support different treatment for age
restrictions employed in bona fide senior citizen housing arrangements.
First, evidence indicates that age restrictions provide affirmative bene-
fits to the elderly and do more than protect them from the "nuisances"
213 See, e.g., Constellation Condominium, 467 So. 2d at 381 (stating that recorded
rule clothed with strong presumption of validity because purchasers have adequate no-
tice); Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, 379 So. 2d 346, 350 (Fla. 1979) ("an
individual can choose at the time of purchase whether to sign an agreement with these
restrictions or limitations"); Preston Tower Condominium Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, 685
S.W.2d 98, 102 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that rule in declaration possesses strong
presumption of validity since purchasing owners know and accept restrictions).
The notice argument is taken quite far by some courts sustaining age restrictions
enacted after the owner bought. They state that although there was no age restriction
in effect at purchase, he had notice that the condominium rules could be changed. See,
e.g., Everglades Plaza Condominium Ass'n v. Buckner, 462 So. 2d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 146
Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978).
214 See, e.g., Riley, 22 Ariz. App. at 230, 526 P.2d at 752 ("a quiet, peaceful neigh-
borhood by eliminating noise associated with children at play or otherwise"); Franklin,
379 So. 2d at 351 (describing special construction and social needs of elderly citizens);
Preston Tower, 685 S.W.2d at 101 ("[A]ge limitations or restrictions are reasonable
means to accomplish the lawful purpose of providing appropriate facilities for the dif-
fering housing needs and desires of varying age groups."); Ritchey, 81 Cal. App. 3d at
695, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 699 ("[The restriction] does much to eliminate the noise and
distractions caused by children." (quoting Riley, 22 Ariz. App. at 232, 526 P.2d at
753)).
215 For vague references, see Riley, 22 Ariz. App. at 231, 526 P.2d at 752 (stating
that there is no evidence of a housing shortage); Ritchey, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 695, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 699 (finding no impermissible restraint on alienation).
216 See O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 796-97, 662 P.2d
427, 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (1983).
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of children. A "seniors only" community provides "significant psycho-
logical, social and economic benefits. '217 The presence of other elderly
people boosts morale, facilitates social interaction, and creates an envi-
ronment that sustains the community.1 8 While there may be some
"moral ambience" benefits in living in a single family use zone, 1 9 they
do not seem as direct as age restrictions in a bona fide senior housing
arrangement. Moreover, the plight of seniors in our society may be
even more precarious than that of families.
Second, the differences between condominiums and residential subdi-
vision restrictions may be relevant. Many, though not all, condomini-
ums are established in multi-unit, high-rise buildings where there is
close proximity of people, a sharing of common facilities, and a commu-
nal focus. In those situations the courts may be especially solicitous of
the affirmative benefits of age restrictions. This contrasts with a subdi-
vision of single family houses where there is less interaction and a
greater emphasis on individual autonomy.
3. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
Congress has recently preempted much of the debate over restrictive
covenants barring children with the passage of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988. The act amended the Fair Housing Act of
1968.220 The amendments bar discrimination in the sale or rental of
dwellings on the basis of "familial status,"221 which is defined as being
an individual under eighteen domiciled with a parent or another person
having legal custody over the individual or with a designee of the par-
ent or other person.22 The statute specifically does not bar discrimina-
tion against children in "housing for older persons," defined either as
housing under certain federal or state programs, intended for and solely
occupied by persons over 62, or, subject to certain requirements, in-
tended and operated for occupancy by at least one person over 55.223
Although the amendment applies to both sales and rentals, appar-
217 Travalio, supra note 135, at 318.
218 Id. at 318-19.
219 Michelman, supra note 92, at 194; see also supra notes 92-94 and accompany-
ing text.
220 Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 1619.
221 Id. § 6(b).
222 Id. § 5(b).
223 Id. § 5(d).
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ently the greater focus was on rental discrimination.224 Concurrently,
the legislation meets the concerns and political power of elderly citizens
by preserving bars against children in bona fide senior communities.
Moreover, although the protected class under the legislation is chil-
dren, parents are perhaps the more direct beneficiaries since it is the
parents who actually have been prevented from leasing and buying.
Thus, the amendment's protections are noteworthy in that one can
choose whether to have children, while the other forms of discrimina-
tion barred by the statute are based on immutable characteristics such
as race and sex. 225 The legislative history indicated that the amend-
ments were part of Congress' "long tradition of defining and protecting
families. ' 226 Apparently Congress also felt that the protection of tradi-
tional family life, encompassing the birth and rearing of children, was
so important that it extended the concept of the statute. 227 A congres-
sional consensus to extend protection to other groups running afoul of
single family use servitudes seems unlikely. This is because extending
protection would benefit nonconforming rather than traditional behav-
ior and because the problem of single family use covenants does not
seem as pervasive or severe as age restrictions.
CONCLUSION
In recent years there has been an increase in living and support ar-
rangements which differ from traditional family life. During that same
time, there have been fundamental changes in the structure and stabil-
ity of the prototypical American family. These developments have a
direct effect on the validity and enforceability of real covenants limiting
occupants of realty to a single family. Application of a traditional fam-
ily definition will bar many alternate arrangements but reinforce the
choice of the covenantee, while use of a broad definition may erode
some barriers designed to protect traditional family life.
224 See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text; see also 134 CONG. REC.
S10,454-55 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, the Bill's
sponsor).
225 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982) (race, color, religion, sex, national origin). Theo-
retically, one can change religion; however, the religion one received at birth can re-
main a basis for discrimination.
226 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FAIR HOUSING
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988, H. REP. 100-11, June 17, 1988, at 19.
227 See id. at 95 (dissenting views of members Hyde, Sensenbrenner, Gekas,
Dannemeyer, Swindall, and Slaughter).
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This Article has suggested a middle ground between these two posi-
tions. It will protect a single family house neighborhood from spillover
projected beyond the borders of a particular house, but it will not con-
trol private choices within the privacy of the home. This result is com-
pelled under general policy considerations and by specific policies of
real covenants law. It also recognizes and reinforces the plurality of
American households in the late twentieth century.
